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The Role of Diffusion Characteristics in 
Formulating a General Theory of Law and 
Technology 
Gaia Bernstein∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
A general theory of law and technology could provide policy 
guidelines that improve technology regulators’ decision-
making.  Opponents of such general theory caution that 
generalizations might prevent the recognition of technological 
uniqueness, and that the application of broad and 
indiscriminate principles could impede the identification and 
appropriate social accommodation of important and novel 
technologies.  To overcome this objection, a general theory of 
law and technology should provide fine-tuned policy principles 
that identify the main characteristics differentiating 
technologies while still providing a common framework that 
deals with their common attributes. 
In this Article, I suggest that the technological 
characteristics that influence a technology’s diffusion—its 
social adoption process—would provide a constructive 
foundation for formulating fine-tuned policy guidelines.  Policy 
principles based on the identification of the technological 
characteristics that influence a technology’s diffusion (diffusion 
characteristics) would not apply narrowly to a specific 
technology nor would they provide overly broad guidelines 
relevant to all technologies.  Rather, policy guidelines based on 
diffusion characteristics would be appropriately attuned to both 
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technological differences and commonalities. 
To illustrate my proposal I use case studies of privacy 
controversies involving two technologies: genetic testing and 
the Internet.  I hope to promote the general theory project by 
also showing that helpful insights can be derived from the joint 
study of seemingly very different technologies.  The two case 
studies exhibit paradoxical relationships between privacy 
protection and technological diffusion.  In the case of genetic 
testing, I focus on genetic discrimination.  My analysis of 
empirical data shows that although genetic discrimination is 
rare and apparently on the decline, concerns about 
discrimination preclude individuals from using genetic testing, 
thereby inhibiting the diffusion of an important new 
technology.  At the same time, my examination of the collection 
of personal information by commercial entities on the Internet 
reveals a mirror-image paradox.  While use of privacy-
threatening devices, such as cookies is on the rise, the 
increasing privacy threat has not inhibited Internet diffusion. 
I suggest that by focusing on diffusion characteristics we 
could accomplish two goals.  First, identification of the diffusion 
characteristics that made a technology susceptible to the 
privacy-diffusion paradox could be useful in predicting which 
technologies are likely to fall prey to a similar paradoxical 
relationship.  Specifically, I argue that genetic testing’s 
preventive and non-triable qualities and the Internet’s critical-
mass-point quality and decentralized nature made them 
vulnerable to their respective privacy-diffusion paradoxes. 
Second, understanding the role of diffusion characteristics 
in these controversies could serve to formulate policy guidelines 
to help resolve both the controversies at issue and future 
techno-privacy disputes involving similar technologies.  I 
propose that where a technology, like genetic testing, exhibits 
preventive and non-triable diffusion characteristics, an express 
and clear-cut privacy protecting law is needed, not necessarily 
to combat the privacy threat itself, but to alleviate individuals’ 
fears that inhibit them from using the technology.  Further, 
where a technology is centrally diffused, as is genetic testing, 
efforts to reduce concerns are likely to be most effective when 
directed at those diffusing the technology, in this case, genetic 
counselors. I also suggest that when a technology, like the 
Internet, has a critical mass quality and is decentrally diffused, 
social norms, in this case non-privacy norms, are quickly 
entrenched.  At that point, both legal and technological 
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measures become less effective.  Consequently, in these 
instances, timing should become an important factor in 
regulators’ decision-making process. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I presents the two 
privacy-diffusion paradoxes of genetic discrimination and 
commercial privacy on the Internet.  Part II identifies the 
diffusion characteristics that made genetic testing and the 
Internet susceptible to their respective paradoxes.  Finally, 
Part III proposes use of diffusion characteristics as a policy tool 
to resolve techno-privacy controversies. 
I. PRIVACY-DIFFUSION PARADOX MODELS 
A. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 
The public is greatly concerned about genetic 
discrimination by employers and insurers.1  The media, 
governmental organizations, and public interest organizations 
spread genetic discrimination fears.2 Furthermore, medical 
professionals, particularly genetic counselors, share these 
concerns.3  They play a major role in spreading genetic 
discrimination fears by warning their patients that genetic 
testing could result in genetic discrimination.4  Consequently, 
 1. Eighty-four percent believe that health insurance companies will deny 
coverage, and 69% believe that employers will deny people jobs because of 
genetic test results.  See VCU CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, VCU LIFE 
SCIENCES SURVEY: AMERICANS WELCOME SCIENTIFIC ADVANCEMENTS WITH 
CAUTION (2001), available at 
http://www.vcu.edu/lifesci/images2/survey2001.pdf. 
 2. See COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: 
POSITION PAPER 1 (2001), available at http://www.gene-
watch.org/educational/genetic_discrimination.pdf (warning that “an increasing 
number of healthy individuals have suffered discrimination on the basis of 
predictive genetic information”); Press Release, Nat’l Human Genome 
Research Inst., Health Insurance in the Age of Genetics (July 1997), available 
at http://www.genome.gov/10000879 (underscoring data regarding genetic 
discrimination); Geoffrey Cowley et al., Flunk the Gene Test and Lose Your 
Insurance, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1996, at 48; GATTACA (Sony Pictures 1997) 
(depicting a future society of rigid genetic hierarchy).  For a description of 
genetic discrimination concerns, see LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELKIN, 
BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE 
82–101 (2001). 
 3. See Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Laws Restricting Health 
Insurers’ Use of Genetic Information: Impact on Genetic Discrimination, 66 
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 293, 295-96 (2000). 
 4. See Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Genetic Privacy Laws and 
Patients’ Fear of Discrimination by Health Insurers: The View from Genetic 
Counselors, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 245, 247-48 (2000). 
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for many individuals, genetic testing has become synonymous 
with genetic discrimination. 
Nevertheless, a survey I conducted of empirical research on 
genetic discrimination by insurers and employers revealed 
that, in fact, genetic discrimination is rare and that despite the 
growth in the number of available tests, it is on the decline.5 
The prevalence of fears of discrimination despite the 
absence of supporting evidence is disconcerting because of its 
effect on individuals’ decisions to undergo genetic testing.  
Although the decision of whether or not to undergo genetic 
testing is motivated by additional factors, research has shown 
that fear of genetic discrimination by insurers and employers is 
the primary barrier against testing, particularly among pre-
symptomatic adults who could test for adult onset diseases.6 
The current legal regime provides only partial and 
inconsistent protection from genetic discrimination.7  It has not 
played an important part in preventing genetic 
discrimination.8  But, more importantly, it has not alleviated 
the genetic discrimination concerns of either genetic counselors 
or those contemplating the use of the technology.  Studies have 
shown no reduction in patients’ fears following the enactment 
 5. Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic 
Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 243, 257-266 (2006). 
 6. See, e.g., Katherine P. Geer et al., Factors Influencing Patients’ 
Decisions to Decline Cancer Genetic Counseling Services, 10 J. GENETIC 
COUNSELING 25, 30–31 (2001).  For a discussion of the relevant literature, see 
Bernstein, supra note 5, at 263-64.  Adult onset diseases are genetic diseases 
that may develop later in life, such as breast cancer, Alzheimer’s disease or 
Huntington’s disease. 
 7. On the federal level, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provide only 
partial protection.  See Health Insurance and Portability Act of 1996, 29 
U.S.C. § 1182 (2000); American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101–12213 (2000); see also 3 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902 (1995); 
Edward J. Larson, The Meaning of Human Gene Testing for Disability Rights, 
70 U. CIN. L. REV. 913, 927–28 (2002).  On the state level, genetic 
discrimination protection is comprised of a confusing patchwork of state laws 
offering inconsistent and partial protection. See Paul Steven Miller, Is There a 
Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 225, 259–63 (2000); Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., 
Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance, http://www.genome.gov/10002328 
(last reviewed Nov. 2006).  For a survey of genetic discrimination laws, see, 
John V. Jacobi, Genetic Discrimination in a Time of False Hopes, 30 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 363, 368–75 (2003). 
 8. Hall & Rich, supra note 3, at 297, 300-1, 304. 
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of genetic discrimination laws
Hence, the findings point to a privacy-diffusion 
relationship that gives cause for concern.  Genetic 
discrimination is rare and apparently on the decline.  Yet, 
misperception of the practice of genetic discrimination inhibits 
the diffusion of genetic testing technology.  Genetic 
discrimination laws provide partial protection at best and 
contribute to the uncertainty regarding the status of privacy 
protection.  Consequently, the law has not been a major factor 
in inhibiting genetic discrimination, nor has it been successful 
in alleviating individuals’ genetic discrimination concerns, thus 
failing to facilitate broader adoption of the technology. 
B. INTERNET PRIVACY 
With the advent of the Internet to popular use, web sites 
and commercial-profiling companies began collecting personal 
information, through use of cookies, spyware, and the less well-
known web bugs.  Their goal was to target advertising at 
Internet users and sometimes to transform Internet sites to 
match a visitor’s interests and financial ability.10 
Commercial collection of personal information on the 
Internet reached public awareness in 1999–2000.11  Yet, 
despite mounting public pressure, courts have not found 
commercial profiling through use of cookies as compromising 
individuals’ privacy.12  Further, legislative responses focused 
only on spyware and the settlements reached between 
government agencies and collectors of personal information on 
 9. Hall & Rich, supra note 4, at 253. 
 10. See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., GHOSTS IN OUR MACHINES: 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY PROPOSALS ON THE “SPYWARE” PROBLEM 2 (2003); 
Microsoft, Understanding Cookies, 
http://www.microsoft.com/resources/documentation/windows/xp/all/proddocs/e
n-us/sec_cook.mspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).  
 11. See, e.g., Amid Protests, DoubleClick and Abacus Announce Plans for 
$1 Billion Merger, ELECTRONIC ADVERTISING & MARKETPLACE REP., June 29, 
1999 (describing concerns that a merger of an online marketing firm with a 
consumer data tracking information firm would threaten online privacy); 
Joseph Gallivan, Privacy Group Calls for DoubleClick Nix, N.Y. POST, June 
22, 1999, at 39.  Descriptions of the cookies’ privacy threat also began 
appearing in legal scholarship.  See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of 
Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1486–90 (2000). 
 12. See In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. M-00-1381, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16947, at *18, *27 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); Chance v. Avenue A., 
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1162 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re DoubleClick, Inc., 
Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 526 (S.D.N.Y 2001). 
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the Internet failed to provide a comprehensive solution.13  
Consequently, the law, in effect, produced a legal 
pronouncement permitting collection of personal information on 
the Internet. 
Legal regulation was not the only potential mode of 
regulation for the collection of personal information on the 
Internet.  Two other modes were tried: industry self-regulation 
and technological solutions.  However, neither of these proved 
effective in containing information collection practices.14 
Unsurprisingly, the findings of a survey I have conducted 
of empirical data measuring the use of privacy-threatening 
Internet technologies revealed that the practice of collecting 
personal information and commercial profiling is booming.15  
At the same time, it appears that concerns about the privacy 
threat posed by the Internet have not made any evident impact 
on the diffusion of the technology.  In the period between 2000-
2003, when users became increasingly aware of the threat to 
their Internet privacy, the U.S. online population expanded 
 13. See Elaine M. Laflamme, Privacy is Becoming a Company Affair: 
Protecting Personal Information Means More than Posting Policies on Web 
Sites, N.Y. L.J., Jun. 10, 2002, at S6; JOSEPH TUROW, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y 
CTR., AMERICANS & ONLINE PRIVACY: THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN 8 (2003), 
available at http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/internet-privacy-report/36-
page-turow-version-9.pdf.  An agreement between the Attorneys’ General of 
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Vermont, and Washington and DoubleClick, Inc. provides 
an example of states’ response to problems with the collection of personal 
information.  See Agreement between the Attorneys General of the States of 
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Vermont, and Washington, and Doubleclick Inc., In re 
DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 00 
Civ 0641 NRB), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26a_02_attach.pdf; Press 
Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney Gen., Major Online Advertisers 
Agrees to Privacy Standards for Online Tracking: Company to Increase 
Visibility and Verify Data Collection Practices (Aug. 26, 2002), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26a_02.html;   For legislation 
and case law restricting use of spyware see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22947 
(West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-40-102 (West 2005); 
Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co., LLC., et al., v. The Gator Corp., 
No. Civ.A.02-909-A, 2002 WL 31356645, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2002).  In 
addition, many states and the federal government have new spyware bills.  
See Securely Protect Yourself against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. REP. NO. 109-
32 (2005).  See generally Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of 
Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1283 (2005) (discussing the 
application of privacy law to spyware). 
 14. Bernstein, supra note 5, at 268-70. 
 15. Id. at 270-2. 
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from eighty-six million in 2000, to one hundred and twenty-six 
million in 2003.16 
Hence, the collection of personal information on the 
Internet portrays a mirror image of the privacy-diffusion 
relationship paradox evidenced in the case of genetic 
discrimination.  The use of privacy-threatening Internet 
devices that enable the collection and use of personal 
information on the Internet is constantly increasing.  Yet, the 
diffusion of Internet technology is not affected. 
II. USE OF DIFFUSION CHARACTERISTICS TO IDENTIFY 
TECHNOLOGICAL SUSCEPTIBILITY 
Understanding the characteristics that made genetic 
testing and the Internet susceptible to these privacy-diffusion 
relationships is a first step toward resolving the privacy 
paradoxes of genetic discrimination and the Internet.  
Furthermore, technologies are often not as unique as they 
appear at first blush.  Identifying the technological 
characteristics that created the genetic testing and Internet 
privacy-diffusion relationships could inform decision-making 
regarding other technologies that share the same 
characteristics.  Early identification of these characteristics 
could serve as an important tool in the hands of those in charge 
of regulating new technologies. 
In this Part, I identify two diffusion characteristics that 
made genetic testing susceptible to its problematic diffusion-
privacy relationship: (i) its preventive nature and (ii) its non-
triable quality.  I also point to two different diffusion 
characteristics that made Internet technology vulnerable to its 
respective privacy-diffusion relationship: (i) its critical mass 
quality and (ii) its decentralized nature.17 
 16. See MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, AMERICAS’ 
ONLINE PURSUITS: THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WHO’S ONLINE AND WHAT 
THEY DO ii (2003), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Online_Pursuits_Final.PDF. 
 17. Two additional factors may have contributed to the development of the 
two privacy-diffusion relationships.  First, the Internet privacy-diffusion 
relationship is likely also a result of the invisible nature of Internet 
monitoring.  Individuals cannot see cookies, web bugs, and spyware.  Even 
individuals who are knowledgeable about Internet monitoring are not 
constantly reminded that commercial entities are monitoring their Internet 
conduct.  Consequently, people are less likely to react to the privacy threat.  
For a more detailed discussion of the invisible monitoring factor, see, Gaia 
Bernstein, When New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Opportunity for 
Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV.  921 (2006).  Second, the sensitivity of 
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A. GENETIC TESTING: A PREVENTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Preventive innovations are technologies aimed at avoiding 
unwanted consequences.  The rewards to the individual from 
adopting a preventive innovation are often delayed in time.  
The unwanted results may not occur right away or may never 
occur at all.  They are also relatively intangible.18  Examples of 
preventive innovations are using car seat belts, adoption of soil 
conservation practices, being screened for breast cancer, getting 
inoculations against a disease, flossing one’s teeth, and testing 
for HIV/AIDS.19 
Genetic testing is also a preventive technology.20  The goal 
of the genetic test is to detect the probability for disease in 
advance in order to take preventive measures where possible or 
make informed life decisions.  Yet, most genetic diseases are 
not certain to develop even when an individual carries the 
genetic mutation.21  Even if the individual will eventually 
develop the disease, this could take place well into the future.  
medical information may have contributed to the genetic discrimination 
privacy-diffusion relationship.  Individuals are very sensitive about disclosing 
their medical information, particularly due to the grave consequences of losing 
one’s insurance.  Yet, it appears that individuals’ reactions to threats on their 
personal medical information are also context and technology related.  
Although Internet users express great concern about the collection of their 
personal health information on the Internet and take some measures not to 
disclose their personally identifiable information, the majority of Internet 
users research health issues on the Internet.  Furthermore, during the period 
in which the public became aware of privacy concerns on the Internet the 
percentage of Internet users that sought health information on the Internet 
increased from 54% in 2000 to 66% in 2003.  See CA. HEALTHCARE FOUND. 
AND INTERNET HEALTHCARE COALITION, ETHICS SURVEY OF CONSUMER 
ATTITUDES ABOUT HEALTH WEB SITES 4 (2000), available at http://www.ch 
cf.org/topics/view.cfm?itemID=12493; HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, HEALTH 
PRIVACY POLLING DATA (2004), available at 
http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr_doc/poling_data.pdf; PEW INTERNET & AM. 
LIFE PROJECT, HEALTH INFORMATION ONLINE ii, 3, (2005), available at 
http://www.pew internet.org/pdfs/PIP_Healthtopics_May05.pdf. 
 18. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 234-36 (5th ed. 
2003). 
 19. Id. at 233. 
 20. For a study focusing on the effects of the preventive nature of genetic 
testing technology, see generally Katrina Armstrong et al., Early Adoption of 
BRCA1/2 Testing: Who and Why, 5 GENETICS IN MED. 92, 96 (2003). 
 21. For example, a woman who carries the genetic mutation for breast 
cancer (BRCA1 or BRCA2) has a 50% to 85% chance of incurring the disease.  
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., Breast/Ovarain Cancer: BRCA1 & 
BRCA2, http://www.mskcc.org/mskcc/html/8623.cfm (last visited Apr. 28, 
2007). 
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Such benefits are not tangible and do not provide an immediate 
reward. 
Preventive innovations are characterized by a low diffusion 
rate—the technology tends to diffuse slowly and relatively few 
individuals adopt it.22  Preventive technologies have a lower 
adoption rate because of their weaker relative advantage. 
Relative advantage is one of the most important predictors of a 
technology’s adoption.23  Relative advantage is comprised of the 
economic profitability, social prestige, low initial cost, decrease 
in comfort, savings in time and effort, and the immediacy of the 
reward.24  Preventive innovations do not provide an immediate 
reward, but instead promise rewards that are distant in time 
and uncertain in nature.  Furthermore, it is difficult to perceive 
the unwanted event because it is a non-event.  Since preventive 
technologies have a weaker relative advantage, people are less 
likely to adopt them. 
The preventive nature of genetic testing technology 
exacerbates the privacy threats imposed by the technology.  
Where the technology is preventive and individuals are already 
disinclined to adopt it, any additional problem including a 
privacy threat is likely to play a more significant role.  
Consequently, genetic testing technology was susceptible to the 
first privacy-diffusion paradox, where diffusion is inhibited 
despite the absence of an actual privacy threat.  Other 
technologies that share the preventive technology 
characteristic also have a higher likelihood of being entrapped 
in this relationship. 
B. GENETIC TESTING: A NON-TRIABLE TECHNOLOGY 
The triability of an innovation is the degree to which a user 
can experiment with a technology on a limited basis.25  Users 
perceive triability as important because it reduces risk and 
uncertainty about the consequences of using an innovation.  It 
provides adopters a risk free way to explore and experiment 
with the technology.  Experimentation increases users’ 
comfort.26  Consequently, new ideas that can be divided for 
 22. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 233–35. 
 23. Id at 233. 
 24. Id. at 232–34. 
 25. Id. at 258 (while Rogers refers to the concept as “trialability” I prefer 
to use the similar term “triability”). 
 26. See Elena Karahanna et al., Information Technology Adoption Across 
Time: A Cross-Sectional Comparison of Pre-Adoption and Post-Adoption 
Beliefs, 23 MIS Q. 183, 185–86 (1999). 
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trial are generally adopted faste
Genetic testing, on the other hand, is a non-triable 
technology—it does not lend itself to limited experimentation.  
Most potential users of genetic testing are members of families 
inflicted by a disease who consider testing for the specific 
disease that is prevalent in their family.  Once they test the 
information, their genetic carrier status is created and can 
affect self-conceptions or be abused by third-parties.28  
Furthermore, unlike other types of personal information, the 
created genetic information is immutable.29  Consequently, 
users of genetic testing technology are generally first time 
users or potential adopters.  Further, even if an individual 
would decide to undergo a battery of genetic tests, use of the 
technology would in most cases still remain a one-time event. 
Additionally, there are five typical groups of adopter 
categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late 
majority, and laggards.30  Genetic testing, due to its slow 
diffusion rate, is still in the early-adopter stage.31  Earlier 
adopters of an innovation tend to perceive triability as more 
important than later adopters.  Earlier adopters are more 
affected by the triability of the technology because their use of 
the technology serves as a kind of vicarious trial for later 
adopters.32  Consequently, users of genetic testing technology 
are particularly affected by the non-triable nature of the 
technology. 
The non-triable nature of genetic testing technology also 
exacerbates the privacy threat.  First, like preventive 
technologies, non-triable technologies have a slower diffusion 
 27. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 258. 
 28. Armstrong et al., supra note 20, at 95-97.  For a discussion of the 
potential effects of genetic information on conceptions of the self see generally 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 
45 VAND. L. REV. 313 (1992). 
 29. While an individual may be able to change her credit rating she will 
never be able to change her genetic information. 
 30. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 282–85. 
 31. See Michael Hall & Olunfunmilayo I. Olopade, Confronting Genetic 
Testing Disparities: Knowledge Is Power, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1783, 1784–85 
(2005) (explaining why physicians are reluctant to order genetic testing); 
Louise Wideroff et al., Physician Use of Genetic Testing for Cancer 
Susceptibility: Results of a National Survey, 12 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY, 
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 295 (2003) (describing the limited use of cancer 
susceptibility tests). 
 32. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 258. 
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rate.33  Individuals are less likely to adopt a technology that 
cannot be tried out.  The inability to experiment with a 
technology aggravates any concerns regarding its ramifications, 
since once it is used the individual has to bear the full brunt of 
the implications.  In the case of genetic testing, an individual 
considering whether to be tested, fears that by the act of taking 
the test she may expose herself to the full consequences of 
genetic discrimination. 
Second, potential adopters of a technology are more 
affected by privacy threats than individuals that already used 
the technology.  Social norms play a greater role when a 
behavior is new.  As the behavior becomes more ritualized, 
habits begin to exert a stronger influence and the effect of 
social norms weakens.  Thus, experience decreases the 
influence of social norms.34  A study that compared pre-
adoption and post-adoption behavior found that the social 
compatibility of a technology affected the decisions of pre-
adopters, but did not play a significant role in the decisions of 
individuals already using the technology.35  Genetic testing 
technology cannot be tried on an experimental basis.  Its use is 
usually a one-time event.  Consequently, the non-triable nature 
of the technology affects the type of users: most users of genetic 
testing are either first time users or potential adopters as 
opposed to experienced users.  Their decisions are, therefore, 
particularly vulnerable to the privacy threats. 
It appears that the non-triable nature of genetic testing 
technology aggravates the privacy threat.  Individuals 
examining non-triable technologies are extra cautious about 
the adoption decision.  Therefore, genetic testing technology is 
susceptible to the paradoxical situation evidenced in the case of 
genetic discrimination where individuals do not adopt the 
technology despite the actual absence of a privacy threat. 
 
C. INTERNET TECHNOLOGY: A CRITICAL MASS POINT 
TECHNOLOGY 
Network effects exist where the value of the good is 
 33. See id. 
 34. Ronald Thompson et al., Influence of Experience on Personal Computer 
Utilization: Testing a Conceptual Model, 11 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 167, 173, 
181–82 (1994). 
 35. Karahanna et al., supra note 26 
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dependent on the number of individuals who use it.  Interactive 
technologies, such as the telephone, the fax, or the Internet, are 
often characterized by “network effects.”  The interactive 
nature of communication technologies creates interdependence 
between adopters in the system.  An interactive communication 
is of little use to people unless others adopt it.  For instance, 
the telephone became more desirable once it became more 
widespread and there were additional people to call.36  Network 
effects become prominent as a critical mass of people starts 
using a technology.37 
Once the critical mass point is reached, the rate of adoption 
accelerates.38  Thus, when a technology reaches the critical 
mass point, social norms regarding its use become quickly 
entrenched.39  Moreover, a technology that diffuses rapidly and 
is extensively adopted is less likely to be abandoned.  The 
telephone, for example, has become such an integral part of our 
professional and personal lives, that it is practically impossible 
for an individual to unilaterally discontinue use of the phone.40 
 36. See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence 
of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 822–23 (1986); Mark Lemley & 
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 
481, 483 (1998); M. Lynne Markus, Toward a “Critical Mass” Theory of 
Interactive Media, in ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 194 
(Janet Fulk & Charles Steinfield eds., 1990). 
 37. Technologies characterized by network effects that reach critical mass 
also manifest a different demand curve.  Demand does not grow as price 
decreases, but instead as demand grows the price may increase.  See 
NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES & CHARLES HIMMELBERG, CRITICAL MASS AND 
NETWORK SIZE WITH APPLICATION TO THE US FAX MARKET 1 (Stern School of 
Business, N.Y. Univ., Discussion Paper No. EC-95-11, 1995), available at 
http://raven.stern.nyu.edu/networks/95-11.pdf. 
 38. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 343–45.  For example, the fax boom started 
in 1983 when the price for faxes was reduced dramatically.  Yet, diffusion was 
slow until 1987 when the critical mass point was reached.  From that point on, 
however, diffusion accelerated at a rapid pace.  Id. 
 39. A social norm regarding use of a technology exists when it is effective 
in directing behavior regarding the technology.  See Symposium, Decentralized 
Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the 
New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1661–66 (1996). 
 40. Rogers notes that the critical mass effect could theoretically accelerate 
discontinuance.  He points out that if people would stop responding to emails 
others may decide that email is no longer an effective mode of communication.  
However, he concludes that such a rejection of email is unlikely today due to 
the breadth of its spread.  See ROGERS, supra note 18, at 353.  For a 
comprehensive discussion of the integration of the telephone into American 
lives see CLAUDE S. FISCHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
TELEPHONE TO 1940 (1992). 
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Internet technology is considered a network effects 
technology.  The desirability of the Internet is dependent on the 
number of people who use it.41  Although the Internet existed 
for decades before it became generally used, once it reached its 
critical mass point in 1990, its adoption rate accelerated 
exponentially.42  In 1990, about 4 million users used the 
Internet worldwide, while by 2002, that number had grown to 
544 million users worldwide.43  Privacy-threatening uses of the 
Internet became common in the second half of the 1990s, at the 
time that Internet diffusion was already growing at an 
exponential pace.  Consequently, non-privacy norms were 
quickly entrenched.  Furthermore, at this point, when millions 
became dependent on email and Internet for every day use, 
privacy threats, no matter how intensive, were unlikely to 
cause people to abandon the technology.  It became impossible 
for individuals to unilaterally discontinue use of a 
communication mode utilized by so many others.  Hence, the 
critical mass point quality made the Internet susceptible to the 
second problematic privacy-diffusion relationship, where 
diffusion accelerated despite extensive privacy threats. 
D. INTERNET TECHNOLOGY: A DECENTRALIZED TECHNOLOGY 
A technology’s diffusion process can be either centralized or 
decentralized.  Innovations that are centrally diffused emerge 
from an expert source that diffuses the innovation to potential 
adopters who accept or reject the innovation.44  For example, 
genetic testing is a centrally diffused innovation—the medical 
profession, primarily genetic counselors who administer the 
tests, control its diffusion. 
Other technologies have decentralized diffusion processes.  
In these cases, the diffusion emerges horizontally via peer 
networks—there is no central expert group in charge of 
coordinating diffusion.  Further, diffusion is accompanied by a 
 41. See Mark Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 1257, 1281 (1998). 
 42. The Internet was not an overnight success.  It was invented long 
before it reached critical mass.  Several potential dates for the “conception” of 
the Internet include: the 1964 invention of packet switching; the 1969 
commencement of operation of the ARPAnet; or 1989 when commercial 
Internet service providers started offering services to the general public.  See 
Gisle Hannemyr, The Internet as Hyperbole: A Critical Examination of 
Adoption Rates, 19 INFO. SOC. 111, 114 (2003). 
 43. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 343-47. 
 44. Id. at 394–98. 
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high degree of reinvention of the innovation.  Users of the 
technology, in the process of adopting and implementing the 
technology, act to change and modify it.  Members of the user 
system have the ability to make sound decisions about how the 
diffusion system should be managed.45 
The Internet is a prime example of an innovation, which 
has a decentralized diffusion process.  From its inception, the 
Internet was diffused and developed by its users and not 
controlled by a central group of experts.46  The absence of a 
controlling group that upholds privacy norms, combined with 
the ability of any user to transform the Internet’s architecture, 
led to the development and spread of privacy-infringing tools, 
such as cookies and spyware.  Hence, the decentralized nature 
of the Internet amplified the effect of its critical mass point 
quality (and related network effects) in producing a quick 
entrenchment of commercial non-privacy norms, thereby 
increasing its susceptibility to the second problematic privacy-
diffusion relationship.47 
III. DIFFUSION CHARACTERISTICS AS A POLICY TOOL 
The two privacy-diffusion paradoxes exhibit a divergence 
from the general preference for a balance between diffusion and 
privacy protection.  Society generally rejects extensive diffusion 
and widespread adoption of a new technology that significantly 
erodes privacy.  At the same time, society also disfavors the 
inhibition of the diffusion of important technologies due to 
privacy threats.48 
In this Part, I assess potential resolutions to the genetic 
discrimination and Internet privacy-diffusion relationships.  
My objective goes beyond proposing specific resolutions.  
Decision-makers dealing with the regulation of new 
 45. See id. at 180, 394–398; DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE 
SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE 50-55 (2003); Brian Butler & Deborah E. 
Gibbons, Power Distribution as a Catalyst and Consequence of Decentralized 
Technology Diffusion, in INFORMATION SYSTEMS INNOVATION AND DIFFUSION: 
ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS 4–5, 12–13 (Tor J. Larson & Eugene McGuire eds., 
1997). 
 46. See Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring 
and Supporting a New Frontier, 11 HARV J.L & TECH. 429, 435–36 (1998); 
Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture 
and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 832 (2004). 
 47. See STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD 245, 250, 274 
(2004) (describing the creation of privacy-threatening norms). 
 48. Bernstein, supra note 5, at 251-53. 
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technologies often assess each new technology in isolation.  Yet, 
there are definite patterns in the co-evolution of technology and 
society that can be used to identify similar problems confronted 
by other new technologies.  I propose that undertaking a 
generalized approach that looks beyond a specific technology 
can be an important tool in improving decision-making 
regarding the regulation of new technologies.49  In particular, I 
suggest that such an approach would be useful in resolving and 
preventing problematic privacy-diffusion relationships.  Other 
technologies that share the technological diffusion 
characteristics that made genetic testing and the Internet 
susceptible to their respective privacy-diffusion relationships 
may also be entrapped in these relationships.  Policy solutions 
based on the identification of the technological diffusion 
attributes that made genetic testing and the Internet 
vulnerable to these suspect relationships can be helpful in 
preventing other technologies from becoming entrapped in the 
same situations.  At the same time, the conclusions I present 
here are based on privacy controversies involving only two 
technologies.  Consequently, I seek to provide an initial 
framework for incorporating technological diffusion attributes 
into technology-specific legal decision-making that would be 
refined with further study of additional technologies. 
A. REGULATING PREVENTIVE NON-TRIABLE AND CENTRALIZED 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Technologies that are preventive and non-triable 
exacerbate privacy threats and are, therefore, prone to the first 
privacy-diffusion paradox.  These technologies are more likely 
to be entrapped in a situation where, although a privacy threat 
does not exist, individuals perceive a risk and are consequently 
reluctant to use the technology. 
Where a technology’s diffusion attributes make it likely 
that the perception of a privacy threat will affect its diffusion, 
the expressive role of the law in dispelling such misperceptions 
is of particular importance.  The law has an expressive function 
that is distinguished from its coercive function.  The law’s 
coercive function affects behavior through enforcement by force, 
 49. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 6 
(1973); Arie Rip & Johan W. Schot, Identifying Loci for Influencing the 
Dynamics of Technological Development, in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY, GUIDING 
POLICY: CONCEPTS, SPACES AND TOOLS 155, 155 (Knut H. Sørensen & Robin 
Williams eds., 2002). 
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while the law’s expressive function operates by sending a 
message.  It expresses normative principles and symbolizes 
societal values.  These moralizing features affect behavior.50  
The law’s expressive effect publicizes a societal consensus.  
Where the law publicizes a consensus that a certain behavior is 
required in order to comply with an abstract internalized norm, 
the violation of the concrete obligation induces behavioral 
change by producing guilt.51 
In the case of genetic discrimination, the law failed to 
influence the public’s risk assessment.  The general public 
apparently did not perceive enough consensus in the partial 
and inconsistent legal protection.  Concerned genetic counselors 
specifically pointed to the narrow scope of available legal 
protections.52 
Decision-makers charged with the regulation of new 
technologies make decisions that can be divided into three 
categories according to their effects on users’ perceptions of 
risk.  The first category includes instances where the law 
undertakes a clear-cut express restriction on uses of the 
technology that threaten privacy.  The second category includes 
cases where the law undertakes a hesitant stance that includes 
inconsistent restrictions on privacy-threatening uses of the 
technology.  In these cases prohibitions are often combined 
with inaction or even contradictory statements that may be 
interpreted as a legal endorsement of these privacy-threatening 
uses.53  This ambiguous stance produces uncertainty that may 
inhibit use of the technology.  Finally, the third category 
includes cases where the law may endorse a blanket clear-cut 
express legal pronouncement not to restrict certain privacy-
threatening uses of the technology.54 
The law regulating genetic discrimination reflects the 
 50. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of 
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2000); Richard H. 
McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 338, 398 (1997); Steven D. Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudence and the 
Depletion of Meaning, 60 MD. L. REV. 506, 510, 515 (2001). 
 51. See McAdams, supra note 50, at 400–09. 
 52. See Hall & Rich, supra note 4, at 252–53. 
 53. Complex privacy balancing schemes and legal efforts to regulate 
indirectly, for example, through changing market incentives, also fall under 
this category. 
 54. The collection of personal information on the Internet evidenced this 
type of legal reaction.  In this case, the law expressly proclaimed that this use 
of the Internet does not constitute a privacy threat. 
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second approach; the patchwork of state laws and weak federal 
protections produces a hesitant and contradictory approach.  
This creates an uncertainty that inhibits the use of genetic 
testing technology. 
Rules in the first category—those providing clear-cut and 
express restrictions—are more likely to influence individuals’ 
risk perceptions regarding the use of technologies that are 
preventive and non-triable.  Imposing a legal rule that sends a 
clearer message and clarifies an emerging norm consensus is 
important in engaging with potential users’ risk assessment.55  
The expressive function of the law plays a significant role in 
regulating technology.  The mere exercise of centralized control 
can allay public fears regarding potential threatening uses of a 
new technology.  Individuals are often afraid of the unknown 
and, therefore, are put at ease when legal principles are 
exercised to govern new technologies.  People are reassured by 
the mere existence of limits that the technology is under 
control.56 
The law’s expressive function plays a particularly 
important role when dealing with preventive technologies.  A 
study on AIDS testing, another preventive technology, stressed 
the importance of addressing not only the threat itself but also 
the perception of risk, that is, the attitudes and beliefs about 
the threat among those who are potential users.  It 
acknowledged that reducing the actual level of risk would not 
necessarily reduce the perceived risk.57 
The need to influence the public perception of risk is, 
therefore, particularly crucial in the case of preventive and 
non-triable technologies, such as genetic testing.  A clear legal 
message, in lieu of a partial and inconsistent one, would help to 
alleviate public fears.58  Specifically, the failure of the current 
 55. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of 
Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1925-26 (2000). 
 56. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to 
Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. 
& TECH. 505, 527-28 (2005). 
 57. See Scott Burris, Driving the Epidemic Underground? A New Look at 
Law and the Social Risk of HIV Testing, 12 AIDS & PUB. POL’Y J. 66 (1997). 
 58. Commentators generally advocate that legal regulation is more 
effective in the form of “gentle nudges” over “hard shoves.”  See generally Dan 
M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000); Sarah E. Waldeck, Using Male Circumcision to 
Understand Social Norms as Multipliers, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 455 (2003).  Yet, 
the change advocated here is not targeted at coercing the behavior of those 
who impose a threat.  It does not propose stricter sanctions.  It is aimed at 
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patchwork of state and federal laws to allay individuals’ public 
fears points to the need for a comprehensive federal statute.  
The clear message embodied in such a statute would alleviate 
public fears and misperceptions that are currently impeding 
the diffusion of genetic testing technology. 59 
A third distinctive diffusion attribute of genetic testing 
technology is its centralized diffusion process.  The medical 
profession, particularly genetic counselors, serves as the 
gatekeeper of the technology.  It has enormous influence on the 
diffusion of the technology.60  Consequently, when a technology 
is centrally diffused, intervention measures should target the 
group that controls the diffusion process.  Intervention 
measures seeking to dispel a misperception of risk should 
follow a similar course.  Education regarding the scope of legal 
protection measures and the actual risk should be focused at 
that group. 
This insight can be applied to the case of genetic 
discrimination. Genetic professionals currently play a major 
role in spreading fears and concerns regarding genetic 
discrimination.  Their knowledge about the law is limited and 
their distrust is broad.  When questioned about their concerns, 
genetic counselors repeatedly pointed to the desirability of a 
federal law to replace the current anxiety-provoking patchwork 
of state laws.61  Consequently, intervention efforts should focus 
on promoting awareness among genetic professionals.  These 
efforts should involve: (i) education regarding the relevant 
those who should feel protected by the laws by sending a clearer message of 
the social consensus. 
 59. See Geer et al., supra note 6, at 30–31.  See also Henry T. Greely, 
Genotype Discrimination: The Complex Case for Some Legislative Protection, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1483 (2001); Hall & Rich, supra note 4, at 252–53.  
Rothstein and Hornung warn that discrimination would take place once more 
individuals learn that they are at a genetically increased risk of serious illness 
and purchase additional life insurance.  See generally Mark A. Rothstein & 
Carlton A. Hornung, Public Attitudes, in GENETICS AND LIFE INSURANCE: 
MEDICAL UNDERWRITING AND SOCIAL POLICY 1 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2004).  
One should not rule out the possibility that a federal statute’s success in 
resolving the immediate problem of under-utilization of genetic testing 
technology might prompt insurers to discriminate.  However, the existence of a 
comprehensive federal statute would be effective in resolving the problem of 
discrimination as well. 
 60. For the influence of moderators in the diffusion of new technologies, 
see Joshua Mark Greenberg, From Betamax to Blockbuster: Mediation in the 
Consumption Junction (Aug. 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell 
University) (on file with Connecticut Law Review). 
 61. Hall & Rich, supra note 4, at 252–53. 
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laws, in particular should a comprehensive genetic 
discrimination federal law be enacted; and (ii) dispelling the 
disinformation regarding current practices of genetic 
discrimination.  Since genetic testing technology is centrally 
diffused, concentrating resources on the group that controls 
diffusion is likely to prove particularly effective. 
B. REGULATING CRITICAL MASS AND DECENTRALIZED 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Technologies that are characterized by a critical mass point 
(and related network effects) and decentralized diffusion are 
prone to the second suspect privacy-diffusion paradox where 
diffusion accelerates despite an extensive privacy threat. 
Where decision-makers view technologies that are 
characterized by a critical mass point and decentralized 
diffusion as entrapped in a problematic privacy-diffusion 
relationship, the timing of the intervention is of the essence.62  
Decision-makers generally have two main intervention options: 
early intervention at the outset of diffusion or the adoption of a 
wait-and-see approach to evaluate the effects of the technology 
before regulating.63 
The early intervention approach carries with it the obvious 
hazards of regulating the unknown—groping in the dark before 
informed decisions can be made.  Consequently, in many 
instances the wait-and-see approach is the preferred choice.64 
 62. For an in-depth discussion of the appropriate timing for intervention 
for purposes of privacy protection see generally Bernstein, supra note 17. 
 63. See generally ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN 
BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING 169–71 (1996); Stuart Minor Benjamin, 
Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 281, 320 
(2000); Moses, supra note 56, at 515-17.  A legal pronouncement not to restrict 
technological uses may be misperceived as a wait-and-see stand.  Such 
pronouncements, however, constitute legal actions that not only affect social 
norms but also require direct legal action should later legal change be desired. 
 64. See Hernan Galperin & François Bar, The Regulation of Interactive 
Television in the United States and the European Union, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 
61 (2002) (describing the wait–and-see approach taken by American regulators 
with regard to interactive television); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The 
End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the 
Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001) (describing the FCC’s wait–and-
see approach regarding the regulation of cable Internet access).  For 
commentators supporting the wait–and-see approach, see DWORKIN, supra 
note 63, at 169–70.  See generally Benjamin, supra note 63.  For commentators 
criticizing the wait-and-see approach, see generally Matthew Fagin et al., 
Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance and Enhance Online Music 
Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451 (2002); Moses, supra note 56. 
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Social norms related to the use of technologies that are 
characterized by a critical mass point and decentralized 
diffusion process tend to become quickly entrenched.  Law and 
social norms literature demonstrates that a legal rule is less 
likely to be effective where it departs substantially from the 
prevailing norm.  For example, a compulsory attendance 
statute that required school attendance until age twenty-one is 
likely to be ineffective in influencing parental commitment 
norms.65  The law tends to be more effective in influencing 
social norms when a new rule is consistent with community 
expectations.66 
Recent attempts to regulate social norms in the area of 
intellectual property underscore these insights.  Studies 
showed that laws criminalizing the misappropriation of various 
forms of intellectual property are ineffective.  Despite 
prohibitive laws, the unauthorized use of software and taping 
of music CDs and videotapes continues on a large scale.  It 
appears that people do not conceive this behavior as immoral.  
The disparity between social norms of morality and the law 
affects the law’s legitimacy and reduces its effectiveness.67 
In the case of new technologies, the cost of the lost 
opportunity to intervene is particularly high because of the 
additional flexibility available when a new technology first 
enters society.  New technologies, especially those enveloped in 
a revolutionary aura, tend to enter society with a relatively 
clean slate.  An initial time period exists in which uses and 
social norms surrounding the innovation are in flux.  However, 
after a certain point they stabilize and reach a certain closure.  
From that point onward, change is less likely.68 
Consequently, express legal prohibitions on uses of a 
technology that threaten privacy are less effective once social 
 65. Kahan, supra note 58, at 608; Scott, supra note 55, at 1926–28. 
 66. Scott, supra note 55, at 1926–28. 
 67. See Ben Depoorter et al., Gentle Nudges v. Hard Shoves in Copyright 
Law: An Empirical Study on the Conflict Between Norms and Enforcement 
(Ghent Ctr. for Advanced Studies in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 6, June 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=740184; Stuart P. Green, 
Plagiarism, Norms and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on the Use 
of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 167, 173, 236-38 (2002); see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic 
Code, Social Norms and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping 
Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003). 
 68. See WIEBE E. BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES AND BULBS 84–85 
(1995). 
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norms are entrenched.  Decision-makers considering regulation 
to restrict uses of technologies that have a critical mass point 
and decentralized diffusion process need to particularly focus 
on the issue of timing.  Yet, early intervention should not be 
promoted across the board.  The uncertainties accompanying 
early intervention suggest that such a course should be 
pursued infrequently. I suggest, however, that where 
technologies manifest the characteristics of critical mass point 
and decentralized diffusion, decision-makers should include 
timing as an important factor in their decision-making.69 
Non-privacy norms became entrenched, in the case of the 
Internet, after the critical mass point.  While the critical mass 
point was reached in 1990, non-privacy norms emerged around 
the mid-1990s.  Many academics and policy-makers advocated 
resorting to self-regulation and market resolutions.70  Yet, with 
the benefit of hindsight these efforts have failed.71  Decision-
makers have not, to this point, restricted commercial profilers’ 
or employers’ ability to use privacy-threatening Internet 
devices.  As discussed, such measures are likely to be less 
effective now due to the current entrenchment of non-privacy 
norms.72  Had decision-makers been aware of the sensitivity of 
the timing decision due to the critical mass point quality and 
the decentralized diffusion process, they may have elected a 
different route.  This emphasizes the need to identify the 
relevant diffusion attributes at an earlier stage when the 
problematic privacy-diffusion relationship can be more 
effectively resolved. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have used two techno-privacy 
controversies to show that diffusion characteristics could be 
 69. Others have suggested manipulation of the underlying social norms.  
See, e.g., Depoorter et al., supra note 67, at 13–14. 
 70. For examples of such proposals see Steven A. Hetcher, The Emergence 
of Website Privacy Norms, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 122 (2001); 
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1371–72, 1387 (1996); FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE. COMMISSION ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON ONLINE ACCESS AND SECURITY (2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/acoas/papers/acoasfinal1.pdf. 
 71. See  CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY SELF 
REGULATION: A DECADE OF DISAPPOINTMENT (2005), available at 
http://www.epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf. 
 72. See Bernstein, supra note 17 (comparing the effectiveness of children 
Internet privacy regulation and spam regulation). 
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useful as a policy tool in the resolution and potential prevention 
of future controversies involving technologies that share the 
same diffusion characteristics.  This Article is based on limited 
case studies and, therefore, can offer only an initial formulation 
for the use of diffusion characteristics.  My hope is that I have 
demonstrated that a middle-ground exists between treating 
each technology as unique and therefore deserving special 
treatment and the formulation of overly broad principles that 
bluntly erode the very novelty we want to promote. 
